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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a "No Cause" Judgment entered in a personal injury case.
The judgment was entered after a trial by jury. The judge who made the order
was the Honorable Judge William W. Barrett. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this
court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 3 because the Order of a "No Cause" judgment entered
on May 10, 2006, is considered a final decision of the District Court. The appeal
was filed in this matter on June 8th, 2006.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION, STATEMENT OF
THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant plaintiffs Motion of
Plaintiff to be Relieved of the Court's Suppression Order and to allow Plaintiff to
Supplement his Interrogatory Responses and other Discovery Responses. Said
motion was made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals should review this matter under an "abuse of discretion'
standard. Blacks Title Inc. v. Utah State Insurance Department, 1999 UT 330
(Utah 1999).
This issue was preserved by a motion filed by appellant. The motion is set
forth in pages 271-276 on the appellate record.

The rule that is of central importance to the appeal is Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) states as follows:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 29, 2001, the defendant in this matter, Thomas Sprague, operated his
motor vehicle in a negligent fashion so as to collide with the vehicle driven by the
plaintiff in this matter, Andy Rukavina. Plaintiff was extremely injured by the
catastrophic damage caused by the accident. A settlement demand was made on
the defendant's insurance company which included various medical documents.
The parties could not settle the matter so a complaint was filed and litigation
commenced.
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Disclosure rules contained in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 26,
were largely ignored by plaintiffs counsel. No disclosures were made.
Interrogatories were propounded by defense counsel and interrogatories were
largely answered. No motion to compel further discovery responses was made.
No motion to compel any discovery responses was made. Defense counsel had an
opportunity to depose plaintiff and deposed plaintiff. Defense counsel was aware
of plaintiff s treating physicians and chose not to depose them.
A pre-trial conference was held setting the trial date. In the hallway of the
courthouse outside of the courtroom where the pre-trial conference was held,
plaintiffs counsel disclosed to defense counsel that he intended on calling
plaintiffs treating physicians to testify concerning the cause of the injuries
sustained and the prognosis of plaintiff. Defense counsel did not indicate to
plaintiffs counsel that he was going to object to those witnesses. Plaintiffs
counsel also indicated that he intended on calling before and after witnesses to
testify at the trial, once again, defense counsel did not indicate that he was going
to object the calling of such witnesses.
A trial date was set, but plaintiffs counsel did not designate witnesses
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(a)(4)(C). Defense counsel
filed a Motion in Limine which was heard on or about December 2, 2006. The
court granted defense counsel's Motion in Limine indicating that plaintiff could
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call three treating doctors as witnesses but that the witnesses could not testify
concerning causation or anything else not contained in the medical records. The
court also excluded one very important "before and after" witness which plaintiff
intended to call.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to be Relieved of the effects of the court's ruling,
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), but the motion was denied. A
trial was held and a "No Cause" Judgment was rendered.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter on August 27, 2003. (See Record
on Appeal at pp. 1-6.)
2. The Complaint alleges the negligence of the defendant wherein the
defendant negligently knifed his car into plaintiffs vehicle causing plaintiff
damages. (See Id.)
3. Interrogatories and document production demands were propounded on
plaintiff by defendant. (See Record on Appeal at pp. 294-311.)
4. The following occurred during the course of the proceedings:
a. Plaintiff did not file Initial Disclosures; (See Record on Appeal at p.
294-311.)
b. Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but did not supplement them; (See
Record on Appeal, pp. 294-311.)
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c. In plaintiffs answers to interrogatories, he identified only one trial
witness, Dr. Robert Rothfeder; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
d. Plaintiff did not file a designation of expert witnesses, nor did he
provide any expert reports; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
e. Plaintiff did not produce any documents during the course of discovery;
rather, he produced limited documents prior to litigation to defendant's insurance
carrier; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
f. The only documents that were produced in this case were produced by
defendant and his attorney; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
g. Plaintiff did not produce any documents to support a lost wage claim,
despite the fact that they were asked for in a request for production of documents
and in his deposition; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
h. Plaintiff wholly failed to respond to defendant's request for production
of documents; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
i. Plaintiff did not oppose, in writing, Defendant's Motion in Limine;
(See Record on Appeal, pp. 187-198.)
j . Despite not filing a written opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine,
the Court heard oral argument on the motion on December 2, 2005; (See Record
on Appeal, p. 202.)
k. Plaintiffs counsel was present and presented his objections to the
-5-

motion in limine; (See Record on Appeal, p. 202.)
1. On that same date, plaintiffs counsel produced his designation of trial
witnesses which included four "before and after" witnesses (one of whom was
prominent criminal defense attorney and cousin of plaintiff, Mr. Ron Yengich),
Dr. Dennis Wyman, Dr. Paul Winterton, and Eugene Hawkins, D.C. (See Record
on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
m. Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel at least three months prior
to trial that he intended on calling on most, if not all, of plaintiff s treating
physicians to testify in the matter. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
n. Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel that he intended on calling
three or four "before or after" witnesses. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.)
o. At no time did defense counsel inform plaintiffs counsel that defense
counsel intended on moving to exclude the testimony based on the fact that they
had, not prior to that time, been disclosed. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 269-270.)
5. Plaintiff filed a motion to be relieved of the court's suppression order. (See
Record on Appeal, pp. 269-270.)
6. The court denied the plaintiffs motion to be relieved of the court's
suppression order. (See Record on Appeal, p. 314.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court in this matter committed reversible error because it did not grant
appellant's motion to be relieved from the court's suppression order. Appellant's
motion was made pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). Under
Rule 60(b)(1), appellant moved to set aside the suppression order on the basis of
"surprise."
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure describes four bases where
the party or his legal representative can be relieved from a proceeding. They
include: (1) mistake; (2) inadvertence; (3) surprise; and, (4) excusable neglect.
Most of Utah's case law regarding Rule 60(b)(1) revolves around the "excusable
neglect" prong of the rule. The motion in the lower court in this case was made
under the "surprise" prong of the rule. No Utah case interprets or describes the
necessary conditions for the "surprise" element.
Appellant is claiming that his attorney was surprised by the court's ruling
which limited the testimony of the treating physicians and which excluded a
before and after witness. The testimony was limited so that the treating physicians
could not testify concerning the cause of plaintiff s injuries or his prognosis.
Plaintiffs attorney was surprised that the court did not merely sanction him, the
attorney, instead of severely limiting the testimony the treating physicians so that
plaintiff could not prove his case.
-7-

Plaintiffs attorney was surprised at this outcome particularly in light of the
long-standing policy found in this state and in other states of hearing a matter on
its merits instead of deciding a case based on a procedural error.
Plaintiffs attorney was surprised by the court's action due to his previous
practice in the state of California due to the fact that the plaintiffs case was the
first personal injury that plaintiffs attorney has tried in the state of Utah, and due
to the fact that he had previously informed defense counsel of the witnesses he
intended on calling and due to the fact that defense counsel did not object until it
filed its motion in limine, which was to be heard only a few days before the trial in
the matter.
Plaintiffs attorney was also surprised in light of the fact that the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure do not give any indication that a result such as the one that
occurred at this trial was likely to follow failing to meet the disclosure
requirements found in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the above-referenced reasons, the court should reverse the judgment made
by the trial court and require that a new trial be given to the plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
The Lower Court's Ruling Should be Reversed Because Plaintiffs Counsel
was Surprised by the Result of the Ruling.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states a party or his legal
representative may be relieved from a final judgment, order or proceeding for
-8-

various reasons including "surprise." Surprise is only one of the four reasons
enunciated in Rule 60(b)(1) for relieving a party from a final judgment, order or
proceeding. ' 1 1 le c 1:1: ler if iree reasons ai e: 1) n listake; 2) inad\ ertence; or, 3)
excusable neglect.
The cases in the state of Utah define "excusable neglect" to essentially indicate
that the neglect is only excusable if the attorney has acted with diligence. See

Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462 (Utah 2004), see also Lund v. Brown, ± i
P.3d 277 2000 UT 75 (Utah 2000). The motion in this case was not based on
"excusable neglect"; it was based on "surprise."
There have not been, however, any reported cases regarding the "sum;

/

element of the rule. Plaintiff/Appellant's counsel, has reviewed each of the 38
cases in the state of Utah dealing with a Rule 60(b) motion, and has not found any

Based on this, plaintiff/appellant asserts that his counsel was reasonably
surprised by the outcome of the ruling. Plaintiff further asserts that any time a

from a final judgment, order or proceeding.
This court, and the Utah Supreme Court, has repeatedly said that "judgment by
default" is an extreme measure and a case should, where ever possible, be decided

on the merits." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 P.3d 81, 2006 UT 81, ^ 63 (Utah 2006).
This matter was not heard on the merits due to the fact that the court limited what
plaintiffs witnesses could and could not say and the court limited the number of
before and after witnesses that could testify. The reasons that plaintiff and his
counsel were reasonably surprised in this matter are as follows:
1) Court's prefer to have matters decided on their merits instead of on the basis
of some procedural rule. See Id The ruling of the court in this matter precluded
plaintiff from having a fair trial due to the fact that his witnesses could not testify
as needed to prove the case. Plaintiff needed to have witnesses that would be able
to testify as to causation and as to prognosis. Not surprisingly, because plaintiffs
witnesses could not testify concerning the cause of the injuries, the jury found a
verdict of "No Cause."
2) Plaintiff was surprised because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
impose the penalty levied by the trial court in this matter. This was plaintiffs
counsel's first trial in the state of Utah on a personal injury matter. Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does indicate that plaintiff is to disclose witnesses
30 days before trial. However, nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
anywhere, suggests that the court will limit a parties' witnesses from testifying in
the event that the disclosures are not complied with.
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In this case, plaintiffs counsel failed to disclose, in writing, to defense
counsel the witnesses that he intended on calling at trial. Plaintiffs counsel
informed defense counsel <:; ihe witnesses orally, bi it did not inform defense
counsel in \ iTilinj* of the witnesses llint he inli Tiiit xl < n * "iilling.
About three months prior to trial, at the final pre-trial conference, plaintiffs
counsel informed defense counsel of the witnesses he intended to call; however,

possible moment to file a motion in limine objecting to the witnesses he knew
plaintiff was going to call. Plaintiffs counsel was surprised by the court's ruling
limiting the testimony and excluding one of the witnesses, as indicated.
Plaintiffs counsel was surprised by the fact that the only time he had any
indication that his witnesses were going to be excluded was a couple of days
before trial. Defense counsel did not file any motions to compel or any other

counsel sent no letters to plaintiffs counsel and did not give him any notice
whatsoever of his plans in this regard.
• • .

.

e

fact that a draconian result essentially robbing them of any chance of real victory
in the case would be levied as a result of the failure.

4) Plaintiffs counsel was further surprised at the outcome of the motion in
limine given the fact that Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not
indicate any sanctions for violating its terms whereas Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure does provide such warnings.
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an example of what
plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel thought might occur in the event that they did not
comply with the discovery or disclosure requirements found in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is to
file a motion in the event that discovery requests are not honored. The motion is
to be preceded by a good faith basis of an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute
before the motion is filed. In the event the motion is filed and the court grants the
order, and there is further noncompliance, then the court can issue various
sanctions including striking the pleadings or dismissing the case in the event that
the orders are not followed.
No such sanctions are described by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which describes the disclosure requirements. The only indication of
such a result is found in Rule 26(a)(4)(C) where it indicates that:
"Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the
disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days
before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified
by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objection,
together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility of
materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed,
-12-

other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good
cause shown."
Nevertheless, because the rule does not fully set forth the sanctions that coula
' i,i

is n iVMilH

I iliNi p'.ii'ti

" iMio'MMpliiirH t; iml I'liilc * 7 I i h r I H ill Rules o f

Civil Procedure does set out such sanctions, plaintiffs counsel was surprised by
the outcome of the motion in limine and the court should have allowed plaintiff to
correct its ei i ;:)i

'

.

•

'•

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse the decision of the district
court which ordered the complaint dismissed by issuing a ' \.; ^ aw^ r Judgment.

plaintiff a new trial and allow this matter to be tried on the merits with full benefit
of the causation and prognosis testimony of plaintiff s treating physicians.
D : \ I ED:* !,, u < I: i 1 1 2 : - : ;

The Law Offiee^ef N ,; t;1 hi r .T -I thn line

Nathan N. Jardine/7
Attorney for Plaintiff
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BRUCE C. BURT, USB No. 8453
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
Facsimile: (801) 364-3756

'"i-^cJ

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANDY RUKAVINA,,

]
Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS SPRAGUE,
Defendant.

]
)
])
;
)
]
)

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN
LIMINE

Civil No. 030919128
Judge William W. Barrett

Defendant, Thomas Sprague, moves the court for an order consistent with this motion and
the attached memorandum in support which is incorporated herein by reference.

Specifically,

Defendant requests the following: (1) exclusion of all references to insurance or insurance coverage
at trial, (2) exclusion of the traffic accident report, (3) PIP payments should be offset against an
award of special damages, if any. (4) exclusion of all references to traffic citations issued to
Defendant, (5) exclusion of all documents not produced or obtained during discovery, (6) exclusion
of all witnesses not identified during discovery, (7) limiting Dr. Wyman's trial testimony to the

content of his one report dated 8/20/2001, (8) exclusion of expert testimony from witnesses not
identified during discovery, and (9) exclusion of Plaintiffs lost wage claim.
The bases for these requests are set forth in the accompanying memorandum in support.
DATED this j T day of November, 2005.
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE,

urt
rneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this £_ day of November, 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE was HAND DELIVERED, to the following:
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mr. Nathan Jardine
39 Exchange Place, Ste. 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE

BRUCE C. BURT, USB No. 8453
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
Facsimile: (801) 364-3756
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANDY RUKAVINA,,

)
Plaintiff,

vs.
THOMAS SPRAGUE,

])
)
])

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN
LIMINE

]
)

Civil No. 030919128

)

Judge William W. Barrett

Defendant.

Defendant submits the following Memorandum in support of Motion in Limine:
ARGUMENT

I.

ANY REFERENCE TO INSURANCE OR INSURANCE COVERAGE SHOULD BE
EXCLUDED
Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provides that evidence that a person was

or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue of whether he acted negligently
or otherwise wrongfully. As was made clear in the 1965 Utah case of Robinson v. Henson. 17 Utah

2d, 409 P.2d 121, the question of insurance is immaterial and should not be injected into the trial,
and it is the duty of both counsel and the Court to guard against it.
In addition, Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, allows for evidence to be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues
or misleading the jury. Evidence that Defendant had liability insurance would subject the Defendant
to the danger of unfair prejudice and/or confusion of the issues and could mislead the jury.
Any reference to the existence of liability insurance in this case should, therefore, be
excluded because it is inadmissible on the issue of negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the
Defendant, because it is immaterial and because it presents the danger of unfair prejudice and/or
confusion of the issues, and is misleading to the jury.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT
Defendant moves the Court for a pretrial order excluding the police report as an exhibit at

trial.

The police report is hearsay and should be excluded. Fuither, Rule 803(8) provides that

police reports are not exceptions to the hearsay rule. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-40 (4)(a) specifically
excludes police reports as exhibits at trial. As a result, the police report is not admissible per the
statute and is hearsay.
in.

ANY SPECIAL DAMAGE AWARD MUST BE OFFSET BY PIP

Defendant requests a pretrial order that any award of special damages be offset by any
amounts of PIP (personal injury protection) benefits already paid; otherwise, Plaintiff will have a
Page 2 of 10

double recovery which is contrary to statute and case law. Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22309(6)(a), the "insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable . . . " This request
is based on the principle that a recipient of no-fault insurance coverage is precluded from double
recovery. See Dupuis v. Nelson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981V
Defendant requests an order granting this request; however, defendant requests that if
Plaintiff is inclined to present all of his special damage evidence at trial, then the offset be made after
the verdict is rendered. This seems to be the common practice and Defendant has no objection to
handling the PIP offset in this manner. This, of course, assumes there is an award of special
damages.
IV.

ANY REFERENCE TO ANY TRAFFIC CITATIONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
Reference to any citation(s) issued to Defendant should be excluded. This evidence is not

relevant to the issues in this case and is not admissible under the Rules of Evidence. This request
includes not only the citation issued to Defendant for this collision, but to any other citations prior
to or subsequent to this collision.
V.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM OFFERING DOCUMENTS NOT
PRODUCED OR OBTAINED DURING DISCOVERY
Upon review of Defendant's file, Plaintiff never produced or filed Initial Disclosures. The

Initial Disclosure rule requires that a party identify all witnesses that may have discoverable
information, identify all documents that may support a claim or defense, provide a calculation of
Page 3 of 10

damages, and identify all insurance coverage. Plaintiff never provided this pleading to Defendant.
Further, Plaintiff never responded to Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents
to Plaintiff. Those requests were mailed to Plaintiffs counsel on May 11, 2004. Thus, since the
commencement of this lawsuit, defense counsel is not aware of any documents Plaintiff produced
supporting his claims or defenses. To be fair, Plaintiffs counsel may have provided limited
documents to Defendant's insurance carrier prior to litigation. Defendant has no objection to
Plaintiff proffering documents provided to the insurance company. Defendant has no objection to
Plaintiff proffering documents obtained by subpoena duces tecum either. However, Defendant
requests that the documents proffered at trial by Plaintiffs counsel be limited to (1) either the
documents provided to the insurance company pre-litigation, or (2) to documents obtained in a
subpoena duces tecum.
Plaintiff should not be allowed to surprise Defendant at trial with documents, medical
records, reports, bills, etc. that were not produced during discovery. Written discovery requests went
unanswered. Plaintiff did not provide Initial Disclosures. Further, defendant's expert has only
examined the available documents either obtained by subpoena or to the insurance company prelitigation. Defendant would be substantially prejudiced if Plaintiff were allowed to introduce
additional documents at trial.
While Plaintiff did not respond to the requests for production of documents, he did answer
interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 14 reads:

Page 4 of 10

INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify by date, title, subject matter and
present custodian each document plaintiff intends to introduce into evidence at the
trial in this matter. In lieu of providing this information, plaintiff may attach to his
Answers to these Interrogatories all such documents.
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Plaintiff does not know all documents
he intends on using at trial at this point.
Additionally, Defendant requests that the Court limit the proffer of medical bills to those bills
already produced. Defendant requests that Plaintiff be precluded from attempting to proffer any
other bills or damage documents at trial. Defendant propounded the following request for production
of document:
REQUEST NO. 1: Eveiy medical bill or statement evidencing the medical
expenses allegedly incurred by plaintiff as a result of the subject accident.
Plaintiff was given a specific request to produce all bills that support a medical special damage
claim, but this request went unanswered. The Court should limit the medical special damages to
those bills already produced.
VI.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM CALLING ANY WITNESSES NOT
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED
Plaintiff has only identified one trial witness.

Plaintiff was asked this question in

interrogatories, but he did not identify any witnesses with the exception of Dr. Rothfeder. The
relevant interrogatories are set forth below.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: State the name, address and telephone number
of every witness plaintiff intends to call to testify on plaintiffs behalf at the trial in
this matter.
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Plaintiff does not yet know all witnesses
he intends on calling.
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***

INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify each person plaintiff intends to call as
an expert witness at trial. With respect to each such person, state their current
address and telephone number, the subject matter on which each is expected to
testify, and the substance of the facts and opinions on which the expert is to testify.
Response to Interrogatory No. 15: Plaintiff intends on calling Dr.
Rothfeder1 as an expert witness in this matter, intends [sic] on calling other experts
which he has not yet identified.
No supplements to these answers were produced. Defendant believes that the identification of Dr.
Rothfeder may have been a typographical error and that Plaintiff may have meant Dr. Dennis
Wyman, Dr. Rothfeder's partner. Dr. Rothfeder did not treat Mr. Rukavina and Plaintiff has
produced no reports from Dr. Rothfeder; on the other hand, Defendant does have one report from
Dr. Dennis J. Wyman.
Thus, the only witness Plaintiff has identified is Dr. Wyman. Defendant assumes that
Plaintiff will testify at trial, but Defendant requests an order limiting the trial witnesses to Plaintiff
and Dr. Wyman. If Plaintiff intended to call other trial witnesses, they should have been identified
during discovery.
VII.

THE COURT SHOULD LIMIT DR. WYMAN'S TRIAL TESTIMONY TO THE
CONTENT OF HIS ONE MEDICAL RECORD DATED 8/20/2001
The only record Defendant has of Dr. Wyman is dated 8/20/2001 and is attached hereto as

Exhibit A. Plaintiff has not produced any other reports from Dr. Wyman, nor has he produced any

Defendant believes this may have been a typographical error. Defendant has no knowledge that Dr. Rothfeder treated
or saw Mr. Rukavina. However, Defendant has one medical record from Dr. Rothfeder's partner, Dennis J. Wyman. M.D. If this
is a typographical error, it was a good faith error and Defendant has no objection to the testimony of Dr. Wyman (consistent with
his report) at trial if that is what Plaintiff intended when answering Interrogatory No. 15.
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expert reports from other experts. Defendant asks this court to limit the testimony of Dr. Wyman
to the opinions expressed in the attached report. Certainly, if Plaintiff intended Dr. Wyman to offer
expert testimony beyond that which is contained in Exhibit A, he was required to serve some
advance notice to Defendant of that intent. Because Plaintiff has not supplemented his answers to
interrogatories and did not respond to the request for production of documents, there is no way for
Defendant to know whether Dr. Wyman intends to offer other opinions at trial. Defendant has no
objection to the testimony of Dr. Wyman so long as that testimony does not extend beyond the scope
of the 8/20/2001 record/report. If Plaintiff intends to have Dr. Wyman go beyond the scope of this
document and offer other opinions, Defendant objects and seeks an order limiting Dr. Wyman at
trial.
VIII.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO OFFER EXPERT TESTIMONY
OTHER THAN FROM DR. DENNIS J. WYMAN
Plaintiff identified only one expert witness in answers to interrogatories. Plaintiff has not

given Defendant advance notice that he intends to call any other experts at trial. He has not provided
any expert reports or curriculum vitae of other experts. Accordingly, Defendant asks for an order
precluding Plaintiff from offering expert testimony from any other witness at trial. This request is
consistent with the request made in point VI above in which Defendant sought to limit the trial
witnesses to those already identified by Plaintiff (i.e Plaintiff and Dr. Wyman).
Trial is set for December 6 - 8, 2005. Discovery is complete. Plaintiff did not object to the
trial date. Certainly, if Plaintiff intended to offer expert testimony other than that of Dr. Wyman, then
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Plaintiff was required to provide Defendant some advance notice of that testimony with sufficient
time for Defendant to depose those witnesses and to have Defendant's expert review those opinions
or reports.
In sum, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be precluded from offering expert testimony from
any other witnesses at trial. Defendant will suffer significant prejudice if Plaintiff is allowed to call
other expert witnesses at trial. Plaintiff has had sufficient time in which to develop his case and if
he intended to call other expert witnesses, he was required to identify those witnesses.
DC

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM ALLEGING A LOST WAGE CLAIM
In his deposition, Plaintiff suggested that he may have lost wages associated with this

accident. However, he did not calculate that claim, nor has he produced any supporting documents
or evidence despite a formal document production request. The lost wage claim should be
precluded.
Defendant propounded the following interrogatory
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please state whether plaintiff lost any income
as a result of the accident specified in plaintiffs Complaint. If so, please stated:
(a) the dates during which plaintiff was absent from work as a result of the injuries
alleged in plaintiffs Complaint;
(b) the reasons why plaintiff was unable to work on said dates;
(c) the total loss of income due to plaintiffs absence from work as a result of said
injuries, and how said amount was calculated; and,
(d) the total anticipated loss of future income, if any, and how said amount was
calculated.
Response to Interrogatory No. 10: Plaintiff has not yet calculated his lost
income as a result of this incident.
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Plaintiff never calculated a lost wage claim. Plaintiff has not produced any documents to support
a wage claim even though they were requested. Defendant requested the following:
REQUEST NO. 1: Eveiy medical bill or statement evidencing the medical
expenses allegedly incurred by plaintiff as a result of the subject accident.
REQUEST NO. 3: Every document evidencing plaintiffs damages, including
any lost income.
REQUEST NO. 4: Every document identified or referred to in plaintiffs
Answers to Interrogatories.
***

REQUEST NO. 6: All federal and state income tax returns, including Form
W-2 s or Form 1099's, filed by plaintiff, either individually or jointly, for calendar
years 1993 through 2003.
f

Plaintiff did not respond to these discovery requests. Tax returns were even requested in Plaintiffs
deposition, but there were never given to defense counsel. Based on the complete failure to respond
to relevant discovery requests, Defendant requests that the lost wage claim be precluded at trial.
In conclusion, Defendant requests an order prior to trial consistent with this motion.
DATED this Q_ day of November, 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this $1 day of /fW^bs^
2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE was
HAND DELIVERED, postage prepaid, to the following:
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mr. Nathan Jardine
39 Exchange Place, Ste. 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Page 10 of 10

MOTION OF PLAINTIFF TO BE RELIEVED
OF THE COURT'S SUPPRESSION ORDER
AND TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO
SUPPLEMENT HIS INTERROGATORY
RESPONSES AND DISCOVERY RESPONSES

*H\(\

t in.

*

, . if.- i '

Nathan N. Jardine, USB No. 8215
The Law Offices of Nathan N. Jardine
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/994-9985
Fax: 801/519-8745

LiO

Attorney for Plaintiff, Andy Rukavina

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Andy Rukavina

Plaintiff,

Motion of Plaintiff to be Relieved
of the Court's Suppression Order
and to Allow Plaintiff to Supplement
his Interrogatory Responses and Other
Discovery Responses

Vo
Vo.

Case No. 030919128
Thomas Sprague
Judge William W. Barrett
Defendant.

Introduction
Plaintiff, Andy Rukavina, by and through his attorney of record, hereby moves this court for an order
allowing him to be relieved of the court's Suppression Order which was entered on December 2, 2005.
The ruling came as a surprise to Plaintiffs counsel impart based on the fact of the first five years of
his practice took place in the State of California and the practice of law is significantly different there than
it is in the State of Utah. Furthennore, all of the personal injury cases handled by the Plaintiffs counsel in
this state has settled, and no particular case has got to this stage. The surprise of Plaintiff s Counsel caused
him to neglect filing a response to Defendant's Motion in Limine. Said neglect was "excusable neglect"

under the statute.
Furthermore, the court's ruling on the Motion in Limine was a surprise to Plaintiffs counsel do to the
fact that, in order to make the ruling, the court inadvertently ignored a significant portion of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The grounds of this motion are Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is based on the
memorandum in support of the motion together with any documents in the courts file and any evidence that
may be introduced at the hearing in this matter.
Dated: December 7, 2005
Respectfully Submiked.

Him,
Nathan N. Jardine
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on December 7,2005, a true and correct copy of the forgoing
document was served by hand delivery or United States First Class Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following:

Bruce C. Burt
Nelson, Chipman, Quigley & Hansen
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Heather M Barber
RukaAn PI8. memoMotrelieve wpd
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Attorney for Plaintiff, Andy Rukavina

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Andy Rukavina

Plaintiff,

Memorandum In Support of Motion
of Plaintiff to be Relieved of the Court's
Suppression Order and to Allow Plaintiff
to Supplement His Discovery Responses

T/Q

VS.

Case No. 030919128
Thomas Sprague
Judge William W. Barrett
Defendant.

Introduction
Plaintiffs counsel, Nathan N. Jardine, practiced law in the State of California for five years prior to
coming to the State of Utah. While in California, Mr. Jardine tried approximately a dozen personal injury
cases. During that experience, Motions in Limine were generally filed on the day of trial and heard on that
day. Although the rules of Civil Procedure are similar in the State of California as in the State of Utah, the
practice of law in the State of Utah is far different from the practice in the State of California. The above
referenced example is only one example of the differences.
On December 2,2005 at the 8:30 hearing that morning the court in this matter made a ruling granting

the Defense Counsel's Suppression Motion.
Plaintiffs Counsel was surprised when, at the Suppression Motion hearing, Defense Counsel's
asserted that he had not responded to the Motion in Limine. The reason for that surprise was the fact that
it was the previous experience of the Plaintiffs Counsel as described above. After all, in Plaintiffs
Counsel's mind Motions in Limine are simply filed to be heard on the day of trial.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs Counsel has informed Defense Counsel on at least one occasion three months
prior to the trial, after the final pre-trial conference, that he intended on calling most if not all of Plaintiff s
treating physicians to testify in this matter. He also informed Defense Counsel that he intended on calling
three or four before or after witnesses. At no time did Defense Counsel inform Plaintiffs Counsel that
Defense Counsel intended on moving to exclude that testimony based on the fact that they had, not prior to
that time, been disclosed.
In fact, Defense Counsel has been aware of the treating physicians of Plaintiff almost since the
inception of this matter, but clearly since the time when Defense Counsel first came into the case and found
the demand letter that had been given to Defense Counsel's insurance carrier regarding the matter.
As Defense Counsel properly has stated, Plaintiffs Counsel has not designated an expert witness in
this matter. It has been Plaintiffs Counsel's plan all along, to call treating physicians instead of the expert
witnesses. Despite this Defense Counsel has not taken the opportunity to depose the treating physicians that
Plaintiff might call. Instead, Defense Counsel has chosen to save his client money by not deposing said
witnesses.
Certainly that is Defense Counsel's choice, but Plaintiffs Counsel should not have to bear the burden
of that choice. Clearly, in order to prove his case, Plaintiffs Counsel is going have to call a medical witness.
2

He has not designated an expert witness. For that reason, he was only left with calling Plaintiffs treating
physicians. Now, Defense Counsel has succeeded in limiting the testimony of those treating physicians.
Furthermore, Defense Counsel complains that Plaintiff has not supplemented his interrogatories
responses and did not properly answer the previous interrogatories propounded on Plaintiff. Due to Defense
Counsel's complaining, the court in this matter ordered that Plaintiff is limited in the method in which he
is able to elicit a testimony from the treating physicians.
Plaintiff was surprised by this ruling especially in light ofthe fact the Defense Counsel has never filed
a Motion to Compel in this matter. In fact, Defense Counsel is not compliant with Rule 37 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure in any fashion. Under a said section, Defense Counsel, in the event of discovery problems,
has an obligation to file a Motion to Compel. Prior to filing that Motion to Compel, Defense Counsel must
in good faith contact Plaintiffs Counsel to try to resolve their discovery dispute. After trying to resolve their
discovery dispute, if they cannot resolve a discovery dispute, Defense Counsel may then file a Motion to
Compel. The court has the option at that point to order Plaintiff to comply with the discovery process. If
Plaintiff does not comply with the discovery process, at that point, the court has the discretion to levy
various sanctions including the type of sanctions that were levied in the Motion to Suppress hearing which
occurred on December 2, 2005 at 8:30 a.m.
In other words, the court skipped all of the steps required by Rule 37 and went to the ultimate
sanction of limiting the testimony that was to be elicited. And this, because Defense Counsel has repeatedly
said that Plaintiff did not properly answer his interrogatories and did not supplement his interrogatory
responses. Clearly, theses sanctions should not issue unless the procedures found in Rule 37 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure had been followed. The fact that such sanctions were levied is a reasonable basis
3

for providing surprise to Plaintiff and his Counsel.
Law and Argument.
Under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance ofjustice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgement,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
. ." In the case at bar, there seems to be ample support that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsel were in fact
reasonably surprised by the proceedings which occurred in the above referenced matter. They were surprised
not only because of the rulings of the court in light of the court's failure to follow the Rule 37 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, but because of Mr. Jardine's previous practice in the State of California regarding
personal injury matters.
Plaintiffs cause in this matter is just and it is just that the court relieve Plaintiff of the effects of its
ruling. The fact of the matter is that Plaintiffs car sustained significant damage, through no fault of his own,
when Defendant's car plowed into the side of his car. Contrary to Defense Counsel's assertions, the accident
was as major accident and caused thousands of dollars of damage to Plaintiffs vehicle.
Defendant was on a busy street at the time that he was trying to make an illegal u-turn. He knifed
his vehicle to make the illegal u-turn right into the side of Plaintiff s car as Plaintiff was driving in a legal
and lawful manner in the lane beside defendant.
Because of Defendant's actions in this matter, Plaintiff has suffered significant injuries and damage.
Prior to this accident, Plaintiff was recovering from various injuries that he had sustained in previous
accidents. He was nearly recovered from his accidents. His health was in a delicate stage due to the fact
that he had previous accidents; however, Plaintiff was riding a stationary bike and walking in the pool.
4

Plaintiff cannot do either of those activities now.
As a result of this accident, Plaintiff sustained herniated discs to his back and aggravated previous
injuries. Plaintiffs ankle was re-injured. The bone that had been graphed onto his ankle was torn loose.
He had now had doctors inform him that they can do nothing for his ankle. All of these injuries have been
sustained because Defendant was careless in the way that Defendant drove.
Now Plaintiff comes to this court trying to receive recompense for his damages. He had received
offers from the opposing side which he does not believe will compensate him for his injuries, and, so he is
asking the court for a jury trial so that he may be compensated.
Justice requires that Plaintiff be allowed to at least have an opportunity of proving his case in this
matter. He should at least have an opportunity to prove that his treating physicians are of the opinion that
the accident which occurred on June 29,2001 is the cause of his injuries and that he will sustain continued
injury and damage as a result of it. His doctors should be allowed to tell the jury the prognosis they have
given him.
Furthermore, even though Plaintiff does not have any documentation to support his wage loss claim,
he should at least be able to testify that his wage losses were $30,000 per year.
The fact that Plaintiff and his counsel were surprised by the court's rulings and by the proceedings
and the practice which has occurred in this court, are reasonable basis to grant this motion under Rule 60
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Fairness and justice dictate that Plaintiff be allowed his day in court.
Certainly, Defense Counsel can take the depositions of the witnesses Plaintiff would like to call.
Furthermore, the defense has had an opportunity to take Mr. Rukavina's deposition, and if they would like
to take another they may so that Mr. Rukavina can speak about his wage loss and loss of earning capacity.
5

Justice requires that Mr. Rukavina allowed to have his day in court. Plaintiff should be allowed to
call the witnesses which he has designated, Dr. Winterton, Dr. Wyman, and Dr. Hawkins. Those witnesses
should be allowed to testify concerning Mr. Rukavina's injuries, the causes of those injuries, Mr. Rukavina's
prognosis, and his cost of treatment. Plaintiff should also be allowed to call Ron Yengich and his other
designated before and after witnesses. Certainly if the testimony becomes cumulative the court can curtail
the testimony at that time.
For the foregoing reasons, and because the right thing to do in this matter is to give Mr. Rukavina
his day in court, Mr. Rukavina should be relieved of the effects of the suppression ruling.
Dated: December 7, 2005

Respectfully Submitted.

Nathan N. Jardine
MAILING CERTIFICATE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on December 7, 2005, a true and correct copy of the Motion
to Continue Scheduling Conference was served by hand delivery or United States First Class Mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to the following:
Bruce C. Burt, Esq.
Nelson, Chipman, Quigley & Hansen
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Heather M Barber
RukaAn.Pl 9. Memosupportmotionwpd.frm
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SUPPRESSION ORDER AND TO
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SUPPLEMENT HIS DISCOVERY
RESPONSES

)
)

Civil No. 030919128
Judge William W. Barrett

Defendant submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to be
Relieved of the Court's Suppression Order and to Allow Plaintiff to Supplement his Discovery
Responses (hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition) as follows:
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiff did not file Initial Disclosures.

2.

Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but did not supplement them.

3.

In Plaintiffs answers to interrogatories, he identified only one trial witness, Dr.

Robert Rothfeder.
4.

Plaintiff did not file a designation of expert witnesses, nor did he provide any expert

reports.
5.

Plaintiff did not file Pre-Trial Disclosures.

6.

Plaintiff did not produce any documents during the course of discovery; rather, he

produced limited documents prior to litigation to Defendant's insurance carrier.
7.

The only documents that were produced in this case were produced by defendant and

his attorney.
8.

Plaintiff did not produce any documents to support a lost wage claim, despite the fact

that they were asked for in a request for production of documents and in his deposition.
9.

Plaintiff wholly failed to respond to defendant's request for production of documents.

10.

Plaintiff did not oppose, in writing, Defendant's Motion in Limine.

11.

Despite not filing a written opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine, the Court

heard oral argument on the motion on December 2, 2005.
12.

Plaintiffs counsel was present and presented his objections to the motion in limine.

13.

On that same date, Plaintiffs counsel produced his designation of trial witnesses

which included four "before and after" witnesses (one of whom was prominent criminal defense
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attorney and cousin of Plaintiff, Mr. Ron Yengich), Dr. Dennis Wyman, Dr. Paul Winterton, and
Eugene Hawkins, D.C.
ARGUMENT
L

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(1)
It appears to be Plaintiff s position that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)( 1) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule reads in relevant part:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance ofjustice
relive a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Plaintiff argues "surprise." He states:
In the case at bar, there seems to be ample support that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs
counsel were in fact reasonably surprised by the proceedings which occurred in the
above referenced matter. They were surprised not only because of the rulings of the
court in light of the court's failure to follow the Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but because of Mr. Jardine's previous practice in the State of California
regarding personal injury matters. (Memo, in Supp. at 4).
A.

Plaintiff has not Shown "Surprise"
It appears to be Plaintiffs position that because motions in limine in California are heard on

the day of trial, that somehow he was "surprised" and that the order should be set aside. This
argument lacks merit. First, the cited California practice in California was followed in this case.
The Court, just days before the trial, allowed Plaintiff to orally object to the motion on December
2, 2005. Thus, reliance on the California practice/procedure is misguided. Further, the Court's
Page 3 of 11

ruling on Defendant's Motion in Limine was not based entirely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file
a written objection. While that may have been one consideration, the basis of the Court's ruling was
multi factorial, including Plaintiffs complete failure to respond to requests for production of
documents, for failure to supplement interrogatory answers, for failure to file required pre-trial
disclosures, for failure to file expert witness designations, etc.
Plaintiffs attorney cannot reasonably argue "surprise" based on this alleged California
practice. Plaintiffs attorney has been licensed to practice law in the State of Utah since 1998
(Exhibit 1, attached). By filing a civil lawsuit, he is charged with knowledge of the applicable rules
of procedure, in this case the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules are clear. He cannot
reasonably argue "surprise" when the Court chooses to enforce those rules. Plaintiffs attorney
should have actual knowledge of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure if he is practices civil law in the
State of Utah. Ignorance of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure cannot reasonably be a valid defense
of "surprise" under Rule 60(b)(1).
Plaintiffs attorney ignored nearly every disclosure requirement in Rule 26. For instance,
Rule 26(a)(1) requires each party to file Initial Disclosures. Plaintiffs attorney knows or should
know that this rule requires him to identify all witnesses with discoverable information. The Court's
order excluded one of Plaintiffs "before and after" witnesses, Mr. Ron Yengich. However, if
Plaintiff intended to call him as a witness at trial, he should have identified him in his Initial
Disclosures. He had a second opportunity to identify him in answers to interrogatories, but he did
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not identify him at that time either. In point of fact, Plaintiffs attorney first presented defense
counsel with a designation of witnesses on December 2,2005 - four (4) days before the trial. The
Court properly excluded Mr. Yengich at trial. Finally, calling four "before and after" witnesses is
cumulative and repetitive and this reasoning was part of the court's order.
Another rule Plaintiff ignored was Rule 26(a)(4), Pretrial Disclosures. This rule explicitly
enumerates the type of information required to be disclosed prior to trial and when it is to be
disclosed. The rule requires that 30 days before trial, each party designate all witnesses that will be
called to testify. See Rule 26(a¥4YA). Opposing Counsel is then given 14 days to object to the
witness designation. However, Plaintiff did not file Pre-Trial Disclosures. Thus, Defendant had no
knowledge of the existence of Mr. Yengich (or the other "before and after" witnesses) or Dr.
Winterton, or Dr. Hawkins until four (4) days before the trial was set to begin. Plaintiff cannot
reasonably argue "surprise" given his failure to follow this rule. Plaintiff had an obligation to
disclose all trial witnesses 30 days before trial and he failed to do that here.
Another rule Plaintiff ignored was Rule 26(e), Supplementation of responses. In this case,
Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but the only trial witness identified was Dr. Robert Rothfeder.
Rule 26(e)(2) unambiguously requires a party to supplement disclosures and answers to
interrogatories "seasonably." No supplements were produced by Plaintiff. Thus, when the Court
excluded Mr. Yengich, limited the number of "before and after" witnesses, and limited the scope of
the medical witnesses, it was justified. Plaintiff had an obligation to supplement his interrogatories
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and inform defense counsel of the identify of the witnesses and the substance of their testimony well
before trial and he did not do that.
B.

A Motion to Compel and an Order Compelling Discovery was not Required, nor is it a Basis
for "Surprise" under Rule 60(b)
Plaintiff argues that the Court did not follow the procedure outlined in Rule 37(a) (i.e. a

motion to compel and an order to compel discovery) and that somehow he was "surprised" that the
Court excluded and limited evidence. In other words, because Defendant did not first file a motion
to compel Plaintiff to file Initial Disclosures, to answer requests for production of documents, to
supplement interrogatory answers, to file Pre-Trial disclosures, and to file designation of expert
witnesses, that Plaintiff was "reasonably surprised" when the Court excluded and limited evidence.
This argument impermissibly shifts the burden of production to the Defendant. It also ignores Rule
37(d) and Utah Case law.1 Plaintiff has an affirmative duty under Rules 26(a) and (e) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure to provide these disclosures. Defendant had no affirmative duty to present a
Motion to Compel required disclosures. Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue "surprise" because a
motion to compel discovery was not filed before the evidence was excluded.
C.

Limiting the Medical Witnesses9 Trial Testimony was not "Surprise"
Plaintiff also argues that the Court's order limiting the scope of the medical witness

1

See e.g. Coxev v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles. 112 P.3d 1244 (UtahApp 2005)(Rule 37(d) "allows a court to
impose sanctions against a party for disregarding discovery obligations even when that party has not violated a court order
specifically compelling discovery." (Citing Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585); See also W.W. & W.B.
Gardner. Inc. v. Park W. Vill. Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 n.9 ("No court order is required to bring [r]ule 37(d) into play. It is
enough that a notice of the taking of a deposition or a set of interrogatories or a request for inspection has been properly served
on the party." (Cite omitted)).
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testimony at trial was "surprise." Plaintiff argues that Defense counsel knew who the treating
physicians were, that he was told at a pretrial conference that "treating physicians" would be called
to testify. There are many problems with this argument. First, the Court has allowed Dr. Winterton
and Dr. Hawkins to testify despite the fact that they were not disclosed prior to December 2, 2005.
Clearly, the Court could have excluded them entirely. Defense counsel told the Court that he had
no objection to these physicians testifying at trial so long as they were limited to the content of their
medical records. This way, there would be no surprises for Defendant and his expert. Thus, based
on this concession, the Court simply limited the scope of their testimony to the information stated
in their medical records. Certainly, it would not have been unreasonable for the Court to entirely
exclude them from testifying given the fact that they were not identified earlier and given that
Plaintiff still has not identified the scope, nature and extent of their testimony.
Second, while it is true that Defense counsel knew that medical doctors treated this plaintiff,
that is not the same thing as knowing which doctors will testify at trial. The fact is, defense counsel
did not know who would be called to testify at trial until days before it was set to begin.

Plaintiff

did not designate any physicians as trial witnesses, and based on that non-disclosure Defendant took
no depositions. Interrogatories were sent to Plaintiff during fact discovery for the express purpose
of determining which witnesses would be called at trial.. Plaintiff identified only one medical
doctor, Dr. Robert Rothfeder. Defendant reasonably relied on Plaintiffs answers to interrogatories.
If Plaintiff intended to call other witnesses, he had an affirmative duty to disclose them in a timely
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fashion. He did not timely disclose trial witnesses and it was proper for the Court to limit the scope
of their testimony.
Third, under Rule 26(a)(3), Disclosure of expert testimony, Plaintiff was required to put
Defendant on advance notice of the expected testimony of all witnesses that would be offering expert
opinions. Plaintiff did not file a designation of expert witnesses. Plaintiff did not produce any
expert reports. Plaintiff did not identify any experts in his answers to interrogatories with the
exception of Dr. Rothfeder. Again, Defendant reasonably relied on this non-disclosure and took no
depositions of treating physicians. The Court has allowed Plaintiff to call Dr. Wyman, Dr.
Winterton, and Dr. Hawkins, but it limited the scope of their testimony to the comments in their
medical records. This way, Defendant has no surprises at trial. It would be fundamentally unfair
and prejudicial to allow Plaintiff to completely ignore the disclosure requirements of Rule 26 and
then call three medical witnesses at trial to offer opinions not previously disclosed. Thus, when the
Court limited the scope of the medical witnesses at trial to the content of their records, it was to
prevent an injustice to the Defendant. The disclosure requirements in Rule 26 are clear and
Plaintiff s attorney knew or should have known that he was required to adhere to them; thus, it is not
a "surprise" when the Court limits the medical testimony based on non-disclosure.
Plaintiff has pleaded for the Court's mercy to allow him to present his case to the jury
arguing that he has suffered significant injuries as a result of this accident, etc. (Memo, in Supp. at
1-2). If Plaintiff suffered from a significant accident related injury, the physician(s) that would
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offer the causal connection should have been identified during discovery. It is prejudicial and
fundamentally unfair to keep the Defendant completely in the dark about the content and scope of
an expert witnesses trial testimony.
Plaintiff argues that defense counsel knew who treated Plaintiff and that we should have
deposed the treating physicians. (Memo, in Supp. at 2). Plaintiff treated with many different treating
physicians, but only one of them was identified as a trial witness. Knowing who treated Plaintiff and
knowing who will testify at trial are distinctly different. Defense counsel made a calculated decision
not to depose the only identified medical doctor but this decision was based on prior dealings with
this physician and based on what information is contained in his one record dated 8/20/2001. The
fact is, Plaintiff wants his treating physicians to offer causation opinions at trial that they did not
include in written reports. Plaintiff wants his treating physicians to offer expert opinions on subjects
not found in even an attorney-prepared expert report. The rules of civil procedure are broad enough
that Mr. Jardine could have prepared an expert report outlining the facts, opinions, and other bases
for his experts' trial testimony.
CONCLUSION
The bottom line here is that Plaintiff completely ignored all of the disclosure requirements
from the beginning of the case. Plaintiff then argued he was "surprised" when the Court limited his
evidence at trial based on this lack of disclosure. Plaintiff has not shown "surprise" under Rule 60(b)
and the motion should be denied and the matter should be set for an immediate trial.
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While Judge Hilder denied Defendant's request for attorney's fees and other sanctions,
Defendant requests that the Court order Plaintiff to pay Defendant the non-refundable $2,000 trial
retainer paid to Dr. Chung. This is a cost that must be re-paid when this matter is re-set for trial.
Thus, instead of paying Dr. Chung $2,000, Defendant will now have to pay him $4,000. That is a
significant cost that could have been avoided if Plaintiff had adhered to the applicable rules of civil
procedure. Defendant asks for an order compelling Plaintiff to re-pay Defendant this non-refundable
$2,000 cost. Defendant further requests attorneys fees and will defer to the discretion of the trial
court on these issues. This request is supported by Rule 37(f).
DATED this Jj[_ day of December, 2005.
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE,

u^Burt
Ar' Attdrheys for Defendant

Page 10 of 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

of j/m/W
I hereby certify that on this /'f
II day
day of
foregoing was MAILED, postage prepaid, to the following:

2005, a true and correct copy of the

Attorney for Plaintiff
Mr. Nathan Jardine
39 Exchange Place, Ste. 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Page 11 of 11

NATHAN N. JARDINE
LAW OFFICES OF NATHAN JARDINE
39 EXCHANGE PLACE STE 100
SALT LAKE CITY, UT, 84111
Voice Telephone: (801) 994-9985
FAX: (801) 519-8745
Email:

Membership Information
Bar ID

08215

Status

ATTORNEY - ACTIVE

Law School

U OF IDAHO

Date Admitted

10/20/1998

GradDate

1991

For the most current information on a member's status you must contact the licensing department of the
Utah State Bar.
For an explanation of licensing status please visit the Member Licensing Policy
&

*

liilliiBBiiiii^tgii

m
The Utah State Bar presents this web site as a service to our members and to the public Information piesented in this site is NOT legal advice Please review the
Terms of Use for .more policy, disclaimer & liability information - ©Utah State Bar email we bmaster^utahbar oig

http://w\vw.iitahbar.org/cgi-biii/index.cgi

i:

112 P.3d 1244, Coxey v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Aerie 2742, (Utah App. 2005)
*1244 112 P.3d 1244
524 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2005 UT App 185
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Philip F. COXEY, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
FRATERNAL ORDER OF THE EAGLES,
AERIE No. 2742, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20040298-CA.
April 21, 2005.
Background: Plaintiff appealed decision of the
Second District Court, Ogden Department, Pamela
G. Heffernan, J., dismissing suit as discovery
sanction for failure to produce videotape.
Holdings:
held that:

The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J.,

(1) failure to produce videotape because plaintiff's
attorney determined on his own accord that it was
inadmissible was willful and demonstrated fault, and
(2) dismissal was not too harsh.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Pretrial Procedure <@^=>46
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak46 Dismissal or Default Judgment.
Rule permitting dismissal as discovery sanction did
not apply to case filed before effective date of the
rule. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(f).
[2] Appeal and Error <®==>1061.2
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J)14 Dismissal
30kl061.2 In General.
Trial court's erroneous reliance on discovery rule

Pagel

to dismiss case filed before effective date of rule
was harmless in light of affirmance on other
grounds. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(f).
[3] Appeal and Error <@=^852
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of
Lower Court
30k852 Scope and Theory of Case.
[See headnote text below]
[3] Appeal and Error <@=>856(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Tneory and Grounds of Decision of
Lower Court
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining Decision Not
Considered
30k856(l) In General.
An appellate court may affirm a judgment, order,
or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even
though that ground or theory was not identified by
the lower court as the basis of its ruling.
[4] Pretrial Procedure <©^46
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak46 Dismissal or Default Judgment.
Trial courts have authority to dismiss an action as a
sanction for a party's failure to comply in the
discovery process. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[5] Pretrial Procedure <®^>221
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(C) Discovery Depositions
307AII(C)6 Failure to Appear or Testify;
Sanctions
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307Ak221 In General.
[See headnote text below]
[5] Pretrial Procedure <@==>309
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(D) Interrogatories to Parties
307AII(D)4 Failure to Answer; Sanctions
307Ak309 In General.
[See headnote text below]
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307Ak44.1 In General.
Once the trial court finds willfulness, bad faith,
fault, or dilatory tactics, the choice of an appropriate
discovery sanction is primarily the responsibility of
the trial judge. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[8] Pretrial Procedure <@=>44.1
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak44.1 In General.

[5] Pretrial Procedure <@=^434
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions
307Ak434 In General.
A trial court may impose sanctions against a party
for disregarding discovery obligations regarding
depositions, interrogatories, or requests for
inspection, even when that party has not directly
violated a court order specifically compelling
discovery; it is enough that a notice of the taking of
a deposition or a set of interrogatories or a request
for inspection has been properly served on the party.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(d).
[6] Pretrial Procedure <@=>44.1
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak44.1 In General.
Before the court imposes discovery sanctions, it
must find on the part of the noncomplying party,
willfulness, bad faith, or fault or persistent dilatory
tactics frustrating the judicial process.
Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[7] Pretrial Procedure <@=>44.1
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions

Because trial courts must deal first hand with the
parties and the discovery process, they are given
broad discretion regarding the imposition of
discovery sanctions. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[9] Pretrial Procedure <@^434
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions
307Ak434 In General.
Plaintiffs failure to produce videotape because his
attorney determined on his own accord that it was
inadmissible was "willful" for purposes of discovery
sanction; although attorney's reasoning was not
impugned with bad motive, the attorney intentionally
failed to disclose discoverable evidence.
Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[10] Pretrial Procedure <@^434
307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions
307Ak434 In General.
Plaintiff's failure to produce videotape because his
attorney determined on his ,own accord that it was
inadmissible demonstrated fault for purposes of
discovery sanction. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[11] Pretrial Procedure <@^=>435
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307A —
307All Depositions and Discovery
307AII(E) Production of Documents and
Things and Entry on Land
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions
307Ak435 Dismissal or Default Judgment.
Prejudicial dismissal was not too harsh as discovery
sanction for plaintiff's failure to produce videotape
in response to defendant's request for photographs;
the gravamen of the complaint was the still
photographs of the injuries and campground made
from the videotape and offered into evidence on die
second day of trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(d).
*1245
James R. Hasenyager and Peter W.
Summerill, Hasenyager & Summerill, Ogden, for
Appellant.
John R. Lund and Julianne Blanch, Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
[1][2][3] K 1 Appellant Philip F. Coxey appeals the
trial court's Decision and Order of Dismissal With
Prejudice asserting that the *1246 trial court erred
by dismissing his case under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure -37 when no discovery order existed. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 37. We affirm. (FN1)
[4] Tf 2 Under rule 37, trial courts have authority to
dismiss an action as a sanction for a party's failure
to comply in the discovery process. See id. Rule
37(d) provides, in relevant part,
If a party ... fails ... to serve a written response to
a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34 ...
the court in which the action is pending on motion
may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others it may take any action
authorized under Paragraph^ ] ... (C) of
Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d).
Paragraph (C) of
subdivision (b)(2) farther provides that the court
may impose "an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order
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is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party." Utah R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(C).
[5] % 3 In addition, rule 37(d) "allows a court to
impose sanctions against a party for disregarding
discovery obligations even when that party has not
directly violated a court order specifically
compelling discovery."
Schoney v. Memorial
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah
Ct.App. 1990); see, e.g., W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Park W. Vill. Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 n. 9
(Utah 1977) (" 'No court order is required to bring
[r]ule 37(d) into play. It is enough that a notice of
the taking of a deposition or a set of interrogatories
or a request for inspection has been properly served
on the party.' " (citation omitted)).
[6] f 4 Before the court imposes discovery
sanctions under rule 37, it "must find on the part of
the noncomplying party, willfulness, bad faith, or
fault," Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d
271, 274 (Utah 1997), or "persistent dilatory tactics
frustrating the judicial process." W.W. & W.B.
Gardner, 568 P.2d at 738.
[7][8] 1f 5 Once the trial court finds willfulness, bad
faith, fault or dilatory tactics, "[t]he choice of an
appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the
responsibility of the trial judge." Morton, 938 P.2d
at 274 (alteration in original) (quotations and
citations omitted). " 'Because trial courts must deal
first hand with the parties and the discovery process,
they are given broad discretion regarding the
imposition of discovery sanctions.' " Id. (quoting
UtahDep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892P.2d4, 6
(Utah 1995)). Broad discretion includes dismissal,
which is the " 'most severe of the potential
sanctions.' " Id. (quoting Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d ai
7).
[9] [10] 1 6 The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Appellant's failure to
disclose was willful.
"Willful failure has been
defined as any intentional failure as distinguished
from involuntary noncompliance.
No wrongful
intent need be shown." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8
(quotations and citations omitted). Appellant's first
attorney failed to produce the videotape because he
determined on his own accord that it was
inadmissible. The trial court correctly concluded
that although his reasoning was not impugned with
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bad motive, it was willful because he intentionally
failed to disclose discoverable evidence. (FN2)
*1247. [11] Tf 7 Appellant further argues that
dismissal was too harsh a sanction for his failure to
produce the videotape considering Appellee
requested photographs, not a videotape. Appellant
contended that Appellee used the term "videotape"
in other interrogatories, suggesting that when he
requested photographs of the injuries and the
campground he did not want a videotape. It is
unnecessary for us to determine whether Appellant's
distinction between the requested photographs and
the videotape was of merit, given that the gravamen
of Appellee's complaint was the still photographs of
the injuries and campground made from the
videotape, which Appellant sought to introduce on
the second day of trial. Thus, this argument clearly
fails.
t 8 Especially given the prior history of this case,
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the case based on
Appellant's failure to produce the still photographs
made from the videotape. Therefore, we affirm.
1 9 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.
(FN1.) The trial court erred in relying on rule 37(f)
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in its Decision
and Order of Dismissal. The trial court based its
decision to dismiss in part on rule 37(f), which was
amended with other discovery rules effective
November 1, 1999. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26
advisory committee's note. The supreme court
order approving rule 37(f) prescribed that the "new
procedures [ (1999 discovery changes) ] be
applicable only to cases filed on or after November
1, 1999." Id, The present case was filed October
16, 1998. Because we uphold the trial court's
decision on other grounds, the trial court's reliance
on rule 37(f) is harmless error. "[A]n appellate
court may affirm a 'judgment, order, or decree
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record,' even
though that ground or theory was not identified by
the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v.
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah
2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969)).
(FN2.) The trial court also correctly determined
that the Appellant's failure to produce the videotape
demonstrates fault. Specifically, the court noted
that "fault can be assessed because even though a
piece of evidence is ultimately deemed not
admissible in court during trial or some other
proceeding that does not make it non discoverable.
That was an error in judgment and can be deemed
faulty."
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